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Abstract 
This  paper  presents  a  capitalist-spirit  model  of  savings  by  including  wealth  in  the 
intertemporal  utility  function.  While  this  model  includes  the  life-cycle  model  and  bequest 
model as two special cases, it sheds light on why wealth holding has tended to  increase with 
age,  why  decumulation  of  wealth  after  retirement  has  not  happened,  and  why  households 
with  and  without  children have  not shown significant differences in their savings behavior. 
The  capitalist-spirit approach is  especially  useful  for  understanding  savings by the  rich  and 
savings  across  countries  and  over  time (JEL E21, BlO). 
JEL classification: E21 ;  BlO 
Keywords: Savings  puzzle;  Capitalist  spirit; Wealth accumulation 
1. Introduction 
Many empirical studies suggest that the life-cycle theory of consumption cannot 
explain the "savings puzzle": why wealth does not decumulate after retirement, 
and why wealth holdings tend to increase with age (Atkinson (1971); Atkinson 
and  Harrison  (1978);  Mirer  (1979);  Thurow  (1976);  Danziger  et  al.  (1983). 
Moreover,  Kotlikoff and  Summers  (1981)  demonstrate  that  the pure life-cycle 
component of aggregate US savings has been very small and that most capital 
accumulation  in  the  US  occurs  through  intergenerational  transfers.  Like  the 
life-cycle model, however,  the theory of intergenerational transfer  cannot  fully 
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explain why there exists no significant difference in the rate of asset decumulation 
between the elderly who have children and those who do not, which is shown by 
Hurd  (1986);  nor  can  it  explain  why  there  exists  a  positive  relation  between 
transfers and recipient's income as demonstrated in Cox (1987). 
This paper proposes a possible solution to these anomalies by recalling the role 
of the "capitalist spirit" in the sense of Max Weber (1905), which motivates the 
continual accumulation of wealth not only for the material reward that it brings, 
but also for its own sake. 
Even before Weber, Adam Smith,  Nassau Senior, and  Karl Marx expressed 
similar views, and subsequently Werner Sombart, Joseph Schumpeter, John May­
nard  Keynes  and  Gustav  Cassel  argued  essentially  the  same  hypothesis  (Zou 
(1993b)).  For  example,  Adam  Smith  (1776)  states  the  following  principle  of 
savings in a capitalist society: "The principle which prompts to save  ... comes with 
us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave  . ... In the greater 
part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of 
frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly' ' over the 
principle of expense or consumption (pp. 324-325). 
If I express this statement by Adam Smith on the nature of the economic man 
in the form of a utility function, it  is obvious that the utility function not only 
includes the expense or consumption part, but also frugality or wealth. That is, the 
utility function of a typical capitalist should be defined as u(c,  w), where c is 
consumption and w denotes wealth. 
In the remainder of this paper I show how this hypothesis can be captured in 
the standard neoclassical savings theory as in Kurz (1968) but using an explicit 
generational framework.  This makes it  possible to incorporate the standard in­
tertemporal  savings  and  bequest  motives  as  special  cases.  I  then  consider  the 
empirical evidence  already  reported in  the  literature which  can be reinterpreted 
from this more general point of view. Finally, I comment on the measurement of 
the  capitalist  spirit  in  some  related  studies.  The  present  approach  is  strictly 
complementary to the  existing life-cycle theory and the theory of bequest.  My 
contribution is to explain the part of savings which cannot be explained when the 
capitalist spirit is  not  incorporated.  In  other words, there  are  three motives for 
savings: for retirement, for bequest, and accumulation for its own sake. 
2. The  capitalist  spirit in  an overlapping-generations model  of savings 
Consider a typical agent of the  i-th generation who lives for two periods. He 
consumes c;,1  in period 1 and c;,2  in period 2, saves w;,1  in period 1 and w;,2 in 
period 2, and derives a discounted utility over the two periods: 
(  )+{3  (  ) 
u(c;,2)+f3v(w;,2) 
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where (1 +  8)-1  is the positive time discount factor;  {3v(.) is the utility derived 
from  wealth  accumulation  itself  and  the  parameter  f3  is  used  to measure  the 
capitalist spirit, and can take any value from zero to positive infinity. [I exclude 
negative values of  f3 or Wittgenstein's view that money is a nuisance (Russell 
(1968), p. 144).] When  f3 equals zero, this is the standard utility function as in 
Diamond  (1965);  when  the  term  f3  v(  wil)  is  dropped  for  the  first  period  but 
retained for the second, this is the standard bequest models like Blinder's [Blinder 
(1973)].  It  is  further assumed that both functions  u(.)  and  u(.)  are increasing, 
concave and differentiable in their arguments:  u'(.) > 0,  v'(.) > 0,  u''(.) < 0, and 
v"(.) < 0. 
For  simplicity,  population  growth  is  assumed  to  be  zero.  I  normalize  the 
number of  individuals in each cohort to be one.  Thus generation  i  or agent  i 
receives an amount of wealth  wi_12  from the generation (i-1). This wealth is 
left behind  by agent  (i - 1),  whil�  the  old generation has  already derived the 
discounted  utility  (1 +  8)-1{3v(wi-I,2)  from  the  holding  of  wealth  wi-1,2.  In 
addition to the wealth left over by the old generation, individual  i  receives an 
income  y  when he is young. Again for simplicity, this income is assumed to be 
the same for all generations and the interest rate on savings is also fixed at a 
constant  r  for all generations. Therefore, we can write the budget constraint for 
the typical generation  i as follows: 
wi,I =  Y +  (1 +  r)wi-1,2-ci,I,  (2) 
wi,2 =  (1 +  r)wi,I- ci,2 .  (3) 
Here  Eq.  (2)  says  that  generation  i 's  total  income  [ y +  (1 +  r  )wi  _  1  2]  is 
allocated between first-period consumption  ci  1 and first-period savings  wi  1• Eq. 
(3) says that the total first-period savings plu� the interest income is used for the 
second-period consumption  c  i  2  and the second-period savings  wi  2 .Maximizing 
(1) subject to (2) and (3) yield� the first-order conditions: 
' 
f3  v'  (  wi,2) =  u'  (  ci,2),  (  4) 
(1 +  r) 
{3v'(wi.l) + 
(1 +  8) 
u'(ci,2) =  u'(ci,1).  (5) 
Combining (2)-(5), savings in periods 1 and 2 can be expressed as: 
f3v'(wi,2) =u'((l +r)wi,I-wi,2),  (6) 
(1 +  r) 
{3v'(  wi,1) + 
(1 +  8) 
f3v'(  wi,2) =  u'(y +  (1 +  r)wi-I,2-wi,I).  (7) 
Differentiating  wij' j =  1,2, with respect to  {3, I obtain: 
Proposition 1.  The  higher  the  capitalist  spirit,  the  higher  the  savings  in  both 
periods 1 and 2. 134  H.-f Zouf  J. of  Economic Behavior& Org. 28 (1995) 131-143 
Rearranging optimal conditions (4) and (5), I have: 
v'(w;,1) 
v'( W;,2) 
u'(  c;,1) 
u'(  c;,2) 
(1  + r) 
(1  + S) 
From which, the movement of the wealth ratio (  W;  1lw;  2) can be seen: 
(8) 
Proposition  2.  Savings  increase  (decrease)  with  age,  that  is,  w;,z I w;,2 < 1 
(w;,z I w;,2 > 1),  if the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in period 
1 and consumption in period 2 is larger (smaller)  than (2  + r  + S) (1 + 8)·1• 
The proof comes directly from expression (8). Suppose that  W;  1lw;  2  is less 
than one, that is to say, savings in the second period are higher than in the first 
period. Then the left-hand side of Eq. (8) is larger than one since the function  v(.) 
is  concave. To maintain equality, the right-hand side has to be bigger than one, 
which means that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in period 
1 and consumption in period 2 minus (1  +  rX1  + s)-1  is larger than one, or the 
marginal rate of substitution is larger than (2  + r  + SX1  +  s)-1• The proof of the 
other case is similar. 
From  proposition  2,  we  can  see  the  movement  of  consumption  in  the  two 
periods corresponding to changes in savings. If the wealth ratio W;  11w;  2  is less 
than, or equal to, one, the marginal rate of substitution  u'(c; 1)lu'(�;  2) is greater 
than,  or  equal  to,  (2  +  r  + S  X1  + S  )-1,  which  is  greater 
'
than  on�.  Then,  by 
concavity of  u(.),  the ratio of the consumption in period 1 over that in period 2, 
c;,1lc;,2, is less than one, or c;,1 < c;_2. This observation leads to: 
Proposition 3. If second-period savings are larger than,  or equal to, first-period 
savings:  W;,2;;:: W;,z•  then second-period consumption is no less than first-period 
consumption: c;,2;;:: c;,z· 
In order to see the effect of the capitalist spirit on the wealth ratio clearly, let 
u(c) =log c and v(w) =log w.  Then, the first-order conditions become: 
f3  1 
W;,z  C;,z 
f3  (1+r)  1 
- +-'----
wi,1  (  1  + S) c;,z  c;,1 
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This gives: 
Proposition 4. Second-period savings are higher (less) than first-period savings if 
r{3 >  ( <)1 or if the capitalist spirit  {3 is larger (smaller) than (1 I r). 
In this special case, Proposition 2 can be strengthened: 
Proposition 5.  The ratio of savings over the two periods,  (w; 2 I W; 1),  increases in 
the capitalist spirit {3. 
That is, 




=--- 2 > 0. 
1+{3 
(12) 
I continue to use the special case to illustrate the path of wealth accumulation 
or savings over time and from one generation to another generation. Using the 
budget constraints (2) and (3) and the first-order conditions (9) and (10), I obtain 
the following relation between second-period savings of the  i-th generation and 
second-period savings of the (i - 1)-th generation: 
(1 +  r)(:? +  8){32 + {3(1 +  r) 





From this, it follows that: 
(13) 
Proposition 6.  When  the capitalist spirit is strong,  each  generation will bestow 
more and more wealth to the next generation. 
That is, 
dwi, 2 
- ---'- - �  (  1 +  r) 
2 
>  1  for the large values of {3 . 
dwi-1,2 
3. Empirical evidence 
3.1. Savings behavior of the old in empirical studies 
(14) 
According to the standard life-cycle theory of savings, old people are supposed 
to  decumulate  their  wealth  after  retirement.  But  from  the  perspective  of  the 
capitalist-spirit model,  savings  in old age can be higher than in young age  as 136  H.-f. ZoujJ. of  Economic Behavior& Org. 28 (1995) 131-143 
suggested by propositions 4 and 5.  This theoretical result has strong support in 
empirical studies on the savings behavior of the old since the 1970s. 
Atkinson (1971) and Atkinson and Harrison (1978) show that average wealth 
accumulation  in  Britain  increases  in  old  age.  Brittain  (1978)  finds  a  positive 
relationship between age and wealth holdings in the United States. Mirer (1979) 
examines  wealth holding  patterns  among  aged  married  couples  from  the  1968 
survey of the Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Aged and finds 
that  wealth  (not  including  the  capital  value  of  pensions,  social  security,  etc) 
declines  modestly,  or  perhaps  not  at  all,  with  age.  This  observation  not  only 
applies to the very rich, but also holds for all other levels of wealth. Furthermore, 
after correcting for intercohort differences in wealth at retirement, he shows that 
wealth increases with age. Menchik and David (1983) also fail to show individuals 
decumulating wealth in old age, and, on the contrary, the opposite result seems to 
hold in their study. As for the saving  rate,  Thurow  (1976)  finds positive saving 
rates for all age groups. Danziger et al. (1983) show that the elderly not only do 
not  dissave  to  finance  their consumption  during  retirement,  they  spend  less  on 
consumption goods and services (save significantly more) than  the non-elderly at 
all levels of income.  Moreover,  the oldest of the elderly save the most at given 
levels of income. 
Intergenerational transfers have been used to explain this increasing relationship 
between  wealth  and  age.  But  empirical  studies  have  cast  some  doubt  on  this 
motive. According to the bequest theory, children with low income should receive 
more transfer income from their parents than the children with high income from 
the  same  family.  But  statistical studies have shown  the opposite.  For  example, 
Sussman et  al.  (1970),  Brittain (1978) and Menchik (1980) all have found that 
wealth bequeathed to children is shared equally, while Cox (1987) finds a positive 
relation between the transfers and the recipient's income. 
All these facts are consistent with the capitalist-spirit model of savings. Since 
savings  themselves  also  generate  utility,  the  old  keep  saving  even  though  the 
life-cycle motive tends to reduce savings. Furthermore, as strong capitalist-spirit­
minded parents may encourage their children to have the same spirit, they will 
give equal or more money to those children with a strong capitalist spirit and high 
income than to their children with low income. This positive association between 
recipients'  income  and  bequest  also  points  out  that  the  parents  have  tried  to 
encourage industriousness and savings of their children. 
3.2. Savings behavior of households with and without children 
Perhaps the most important challenge to the bequest theory of savings, and a 
more significant piece  of  supporting evidence  for  the capitalist-spirit theory  of 
savings,  comes  from  Hurd  (1986).  One  may  expect  that  the  bequest  motive 
depends on whether the old have children. But, with the data from the Longitudi­
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and without children do not show any significant difference in their dissavings. In 
fact  the opposite is  true:  ''the  households with  children  have  less bequeathable 
wealth than households without children.  If the observed rates of decumulation 
continue beyond the ages of the RHS households, the households with children 
will always have less wealth than households without children" (p. 32-33). Hurd 
also finds that the saving rates of households witho�t children are always higher 
than the saving rates of households with children. While Hurd's finding challenges 
the bequest motive of savings, it implies that savings can be undertaken for the 
sake of savings regardless of whether a household has children or not. Hurd hints 
that the existing methods cannot be used to study the savings behavior of the very 
wealthy:  ''If one wants to understand how the capital stock is accumulated, one 
would probably want to study the very wealthy. However, the standard consump­
tion  models  may  not  apply:  time  constraints  prevent  the  very  wealthy  from 
consuming even the interest from their wealth'' (p. 35). The capitalist-spirit theory 
of savings seems to offer an alternative to the existing models of savings. 
3.3.  Savings psychology of the rich 
The rich have most of the wealth in most countries. For example, in Britain, the 
top 1 percent of the adult population own about a third of the total personal wealth 
and  the  top  10  percent  as  much  as three-quarters  (Atkinson  (1971),  p.  239). 
Empirical studies have demonstrated some different patterns of savings for the 
rich.  Burbridge and Robb (1985) show that, among Canadian households, there 
exists a significant difference in accumulation behavior among the rich and the 
poor;  on  average,  "blue-collar"  households  decumulate  after  retirement  and 
"white-collar" do not. 
While it is difficult to offer a regression analysis about the savings behavior of 
the very rich and the "captains of industry", their savings habit and their "spirit 
of accumulation'' can be seen from their confessions and many case studies. The 
first example is taken from Weber (1958): 
"When Jacob Fugger, in speaking to  a business associate who had retired and 
who wanted to persuade him to do the same, since he had made enough money 
and  should let  others  have  a  chance,  (they  are  the  followers  of the  life-cycle 
theory,  added),  rejected  that  as  pusillanimity  and  answered  that  'he  (Fugger) 
thought otherwise, he wanted to make money as long as he could."' (p. 51). 
Many examples are presented in Sombart's (1915) book. For example, Sombart 
cites Andrew Carnegie's  Autobiography:  "We were always hoping ... that there 
would come a time when extension of business would no longer be necessary; but 
we invariably found that to put off expanding would mean retrogression". (p. 174) 
He also quotes Rockefeller: ' 'The more the business grew the more capital we put 
into it, the object being always the same: to extend our business". (p. 174) 
Having studied the  money-making careers of  many  "captains of  industry", 
Sombart offers the following observation on their savings psychology:  ''It fre-138  H.-f ZoujJ. of  Economic Behavior& Org. 28 (1995) 131-143 
quently happens that he really does not want to expand further, but he must. Many 
a captain of industry has confessed as much... Most capitalist undertakers think 
nothing  else  but  this desire for extension and  expansion,  which to the outside 
observer  appears  so  meaningless"  (pp.  174-175).  This  expansion  psychology 
leads  to  ever-increasing savings.  If you interpret  their  behavior  as  saving  and 
investing for the future or for the next generation, captains of industry will quickly 
dismiss this intention and "regard you with a kind of mild surprise" (p. 175). 
Wicksteed (1933) has the following description of the savings psychology of 
the rich: ''A millionaire is not only able to save but unable not to save, because he 
cannot spend all his accumulation at  once,  and he is always able to transmute 
present into future command of wealth". (p. 294). "Indeed to the rich man the 
problem  often  is  how  he  can  avoid  saving  too  much.  The  exigencies  of  his 
business may drain him of his income. It is always demanding to be extended, till 
he no longer controls it, but it controls him. It has become a kind of Frankenstein's 
monster that dominates his life. It  must grow or  die. And he cannot let it die, 
partly because he is dependent upon it, and partly because it has become a kind of 
entity to him, and, independently of all the things in the circle of exchange that it 
represents to him, has acquired a kind of independent claim upon his affection and 
his  imagination,  and  is  bound  up  with  all  manner  of  personal  relations  and 
obligations". (p. 298). 
3.4.  The connection between the capitalist spirit and savings over time 
The  role  of  the capitalist spirit  in  the  economic  take-off  from  a  traditional 
society to a modem capitalist economy has manifested in two aspects: first, the 
capitalist spirit contributes to a higher saving rate; and second, the capitalist spirit 
cannot be separated from entrepreneurship in the sense of Joseph Schumpeter as I 
have  argued  in  Zou  (1993b).  As  observed  by  Rostow  (1960),  the  economic 
take-off from a traditional society to an industrialized society requires a significant 
increase in the saving or investment rate from about 5 percent of national income 
to about 10 percent. How does one explain this phenomenon? According to Weber 
and Sombart, the attitudes towards acquisition, savings and wealth a:ccumulation 
are very different between a traditional society on one hand and a capitalist society 
on the other. While in the traditional society the normal situation for mankind is 
that rationally acquisitive activities are oriented to a traditionally fixed standard of 
living and the saving rate is rather low, in the capitalist era, the traditional practice 
is broken down and acquisition has become an endless process. From the historical 
perspective, the Protestant ethic is the psychological origin of this capitalist spirit 
because the Protestant ethic - hard work, thrift, austerity - "must have been the 
most powerful conceivable lever  for the  expansion of  that  attitude  toward  life 
which we have called the spirit of capitalism". These ethos also have a direct 
implication for the rising saving rates:  ''when the limitation of consumption is 
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obvious:  accumulation  of capital through  ascetic  compulsion to save".  (Weber 
(1905), p. 172, italics added.) 
Mill (1848) also takes the capitalist-spirit approach to study economic growth 
in the 17th to the 19th-century Europe.  In England as well as  other prosperous 
countries of Europe,  "in a very numerous portion of the community, the profes­
sional, manufacturing, and trading classes, being those who, generally speaking, 
unite more of the means with more of the motives for saving than any other class, 
the spirit of accumulation is so strong,  that the signs of rapidly increasing wealth 
meet every eye''. (p. 173, italics added). What are the causes of this accumulation 
phenomenon? After citing numerous economic, political, institution factors, Mill 
adds the following: ''These causes have, in England, been greatly aided by what 
extreme incapacity of the people for personal enjoyment, which is a characteristic 
of countries over which puritanism has passed''. (p. 174) According to Mill, the 
spirit  of  accumulation  is  even  higher  in  Holland  where  "the  mercantile 
classes  ...  remained frugal and unostentatious" (p. 175). 
Mill  paid  particular  attention  to  the  puzzle  between  low  returns  and  rapid 
accumulation in his time. His explanation emphasizes the spirit of accumulation. 
As  long as the spirit of  accumulation is  strong, high returns are not needed to 
stimulate savings: ''In England and Holland, then, for a long time past, and now 
in most other countries in Europe ...  the desire of accumulation does not require,  to 
make it effective,  the copious returns which it requires in Asia,  but is sufficiently 
called into action by a rate of profit so low,  that instead of slackening, accumula­
tion seems now to proceed more rapidly than ever". (p. 175, italics added.) 
Keynes (1920) also emphasizes the role of "the saving for the sake of savings" 
in the vast accumulation of capital in the 19th-century Europe:  "Europe was so 
organized socially and economically as to secure the maximum accumulation of 
capital. While there was some continuous improvement in the daily conditions of 
life of the mass of the population,  society was so framed as to throw a great part 
of increased income into the control of the class least likely to  consume it.  The 
new rich of the nineteenth century were not brought up to larger expenditures, and 
preferred  the  power  which investment gave  them  to  the pleasure of immediate 
consumption". (pp. 18-19, italics added.) 
While a strong capitalist spirit has led to rapid capital accumulation and fast 
economic growth, the waning of the capitalist spirit has been the main cause of the 
"British disease" as diagnosed by Sombart (1915), Henry Rosovsky [in Harrison 
(1992)],  and  Wiener (1982).  Once  the  "captains  of  industry" have  lost  their 
wholehearted pursuit of money and profits, and once people have developed their 
contempt for the capitalist spirit, then a declining trend of savings and economic 
growth is inevitable. While blaming large government deficits and borrowing as 
the main cause of very low saving rates in the US, Harrison (1992) is very careful 
to point out the fundamental change in the American cultural values. According to 
Harrison,  the  traditional  American  values  such  as  hard  work,  frugality  and 
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gradually,  "disrespect for thrift and austerity, driven by increased focus on the 
present and reduced focus on the future, has a lot to  do with our low national 
levels of savings and investment". (p. 230) 
3.5.  The Confucianist ethic of frugality and high saving rates of East Asia 
Many studies on  high saving rates in East Asian countries and regions like 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong have taken the capitalist­
spirit approach modified to the Confucianist ethic of frugality. In explaining the 
economic  success  of  Japan,  Morishima  (1982)  places  the  Confucianist  ethic  of 
frugality on equal footing with the Protestant ethic: while the Protestant ethic is 
the origin of the capitalist spirit in the West, the Confucianist ethic of frugality is 
the origin of the capitalist spirit in Japan. Since Morishima does not explain the 
Confucianist moral of frugality, I present some idea of the Confucianist teaching 
on frugality here; more details appear in Zou (1993a). 
The Confucianist ethic of frugality is  expressed in the doctrine of Confucius 
(born  552  B.C.),  the  founder  of  the  Confucianist  school.  Since  the  early Han 
Dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.) until the early 20th century, Confucianism was the 
official  ideology  of  China.  The  adoption  of  Confucianism  in  Korea  and  Japan 
resulted in the Korean Confucianism and the Japanese Confucianism. Even today, 
the moral teachings in these countries and other countries like Taiwan, Singapore 
and  Hong Kong all  have  their origin  directly from Confucianism.  In the most 
famous Chinese classic The Analects (Confucius (1986), English edition), Confu­
cius states the following moral codes on frugality: 
"The  Master  (Confucius)  said,  'In  guiding  a  state  of  a  thousand  chariots, 
approach your duties with reverence and be trustworthy in what you say;  be 
frugal in spending and love your fellow men"' (Book I, 5). 
''Lin  Fang  asked  about  the  basis  of  the  rites.  The  Master  said,  'A  noble 
question indeed! With the rites, it is better to err on the side of frugality than on 
the side of extravagance"' (Book Ill. 4). 
"The Master said,  'Extravagance means  ostentation, frugality means  shabbi­
ness. I would rather shabby than ostentatious'" (Book VII. 36). 
The Confucianist ethic of frugality plays a very important role in promoting 
high savings in China. It is absolutely right to attribute fast economic growth in 
the past 15 years to economic reforms  initiated by Deng Xiaoping. But why have 
the Chinese people with a low per capita income kept an average  saving rate of 
34%? Perhaps this is the reason why most experts on China and East Asia have 
advocated so much the role of the Confucianist values in generating high saving 
rates and fast economic growth in those countries; see Harrison (1992) and many 
references in Harrison's book. 
When Hayashi (1986) makes a detailed examination "Why is Japan's saving 
rate so apparently high?", he lists cultural factors as one of the explanatory factors 
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relation  between  the culture  and  high  saving  rates  in Japan.  There  is  also  an 
interesting  observation  made  by Lawrence Summers and  one  of  his  students 
appeared  in  Hayashi (1986):  "Summers  suggested cultural  difference  between 
Japanese and Americans as a possible explanation of the high saving rate in Japan. 
He  cited a  work based on  survey  data  for  Japanese-Americans  by  one  of his 
students. The research showed that Japanese-Americans' saving rate is 5 percent 
higher than that of the other group". (p. 234) 
4.  Conclusion 
Our theoretical model which includes the life-cycle motive and bequest motive 
captures the essence of wealth accumulation in a capitalist economy: accumulation 
for the sake of accumulation. It indicates that, with a strong capitalist spirit, people 
may  not  decumulate  their  wealth  in  retirement,  but  continue  to  accumulate 
generation after generation. The empirical evidence strongly supports the role of 
the accumulation motive. First, the old do not generally decumulate wealth during 
retirement.  On  the  contrary,  they  tend  to  keep  saving  until  they  die.  Second, 
households with and without children do not have significant differences in their 
savings  behavior.  Moreover,  the  capitalist-spirit  model  of  savings  realistically 
characterizes the savings behavior of the very wealthy, and explains why there is a 
significant upward jump in the saving rates when a traditional society becomes a 
modem capitalist economy.  It  implies that saving rates will be different across 
countries if the intensity of the capitalist spirit is different. In particular, the model 
sheds  light  on  high  saving  rates  in  East  Asian  countries  endowed  with  the 
Confucianist ethic of frugality. 
Naturally, the measurement of the capitalist spirit is a problem. This is exactly 
the issue discussed by Lucas (1988) in this theory of human capital and endoge­
nous growth. Lucas admits that, even though human capital accumulation is the 
engine of growth in his model, '' we can no more directly measure the amount of 
human capital a society has, or the rate it is growing, than we can measure the 
degree to which a society  is umbued with the Protestant ethic'' (p.  35). Lucas 
regards the concept of human capital equivalent to  "the Protestant ethic, or the 
spirit of history or just 'factor X"  ', or the capitalist spirit because these concepts 
all  have  the  same  measurement  problem.  An  approximation  to  measuring  the 
capitalist spirit has been done by DeLong (1988). He takes the dominant religious 
establishment in a nation as a dummy variable with value one for a country with 
dominant  Protestants,  value  zero  for  a  country  with  dominant  Catholics,  and 
one-half for a country with half Catholics and half Protestants. He finds that the 
GDP per capita from 1870 to 1979 for once rich twenty-two countries in 1870 was 
significantly positively correlated with this religious dummy variable. In fact, the 
measurement of the capitalist spirit is no more difficult than the measurement of 
the desire for intergenerational transfers in the standard savings models; it is no 142  H.-f. Zouj  J. of  Economic Behavior& Org. 28 (1995) 131-143 
more difficult than the measurement of time preference and the elasticity of the 
intertemporal substitution in almost all dynamic models. As usual, the capitalist­
spirit model can be calibrated to stimulate the savings patterns in a country and 
across  countries;  or  one  can  follow  the  Lucas-DeLong  approximation  to  the 
capitalist  spirit by choosing a dummy variable of dominant religious  establish­
ments across countries; or, for East Asia countries, one can follow Morishima's 
suggestion to take the degree of exposure to the Confucianist ethic of frugality as 
another possible candidate. In the end, it should be noted that this so-called latent 
variable problem discussed here is  very common in economics and other social 
sciences. [For the interested reader, see Aigner and Goldberger (1977).] 
5.  For  further  reading 
Zou (1994), Zou (1995), and Bakshi and Chen (1995). 
Acknowledgements 
I thank John Campbell, Richard Caves, Shantayanan Devarajan, Dwight Perkins 
and  Jeffrey  Sachs  for  discussions,  criticism  and  suggestions.  I  am  especially 
indebted to Richard Day for detailed suggestions, editorial help and encourage­
ment, which led to· a total revision of this paper. All remaining errors are my own. 
The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank. 
References 
Aigner D. and A. Goldberger,  1977,  (eds.)  Latent  variable  in  socio-economic models.  North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
Atkinson,  Anthony.  1971,  The  distribution  of wealth  and  the  individual life-cycle,  Oxford Economic 
Papers 23, 239-254. 
Atkinson,  Anthony  and  A.J.  Harrison,  1978,  The  distribution  of  wealth  in  Britain  (Cambridge 
University Press). 
Bakshi, Gurdip,  and Zhiwu Chen,  1995, The  spirit of capitalism and  stock market prices,  forthcoming, 
American Economic Review. 
Blinder,  Alan,  1973,  A  model of inherited  wealth,  Quarterly Journal  of Economics  87,  608-626. 
Brittain,  John,  1978,  Inheritance  and  the  inequality  of  material  wealth  (The  Brookings  Institution, 
Washington, D.C.). 
Burbridge, J.B.  and A.L.  Robb,  1985, Evidence on  wealth-age profiles in Canadian cross  section data, 
Canadian Journal of Economics  18, 854-875. 
Confucius,  1986, The analects, translated by D.C.  Lau (Dorset Press,  New York). 
Cox,  Donald,  1987, Motives for private income transfers, Journal of Political Economy 95,  508-546. 
Danziger,  Sheldon,  Jacques  van  der  Graag,  Eugene  Smolensky  and  Michael  Taussig,  1983,  The 
life-cycle  hypothesis  and  the  consumption  behavior  of  the  elderly,  Journal  of Post  Keynesian 
Economics 5 (2),  208-227. H.-f Zou /  J. of  Economic Behavior  & Org. 28 (1995) 131-143  143 
DeLong,  B.,  1988,  Productivity  growth,  convergence  and  welfare:  comment,  American  Economic 
Review. 
Diamond, Peter, 1965, National debt in a  neoclassical growth model, American Economic Review 55, 
1126-1150. 
Hayashi,  Fumio,  1986,  Why  is Japan's  saving  rate  so  apparently  high?,  Stanley  Fischer,  (ed.)  NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 1986 (The MIT Press),  147-234. 
Harrison,  Lawrence,  1992,  Who  prospers? How  cultural  values  shape  economic  and  political  success 
(Basic  Books). 
Hirioka,  C.,  1985,  A  survey  on  the  literature  on  household  saving  in  Japan:  why  is  the  household 
saving rate  so  high in Japan?, Mimeo (Kyoto  University). 
Hurd, M.D.,  1986,  Savings and  bequests,  NBER  working paper  1826  (Cambridge, MA). 
Keynes, J.M.,  1920,  The economic consequences  of the peace  (Harcourt,  Brace  and Howe). 
Kotlikoff,  Laurence and Lawrence Summers, 1981, The role  of intergenerational transfers  in  aggregate 
capital  formation, Journal of Political Economy 89,  706-732. 
Kurz,  M.,  1968,  Optimal  economic  growth  and  wealth  effects,  International  Economic  Review  9, 
348-57. 
Lucas,  R.E.,  1988,  On  the  mechanics  of  economic  development, Journal  of  Monetary Economics 22, 
3-42. 
Menchik, P.L., 1980, Primogeniture, equal sharing and the US distribution of  wealth, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 94 (2),  229-316. 
Menchik, Paul  and  Martin David,  1983,  Income  distribution, lifetime  savings  and  bequests,  American 
Economic Review 73,  672-690. 
Mill,  J.S.,  1848,  (1st  edition),  Principles  of  political  economy,  Edited  by  W.A.  Ashley,  Longman, 
Green and Co (1909). 
Mirer,  Thad  W.,  1979,  The  wealth-age  relation  among  the  aged,  American  Economic  Review  69, 
435-443. 
Morishima, M., 1982, Why has Japan  "succeeded"? (Cambridge University Press). 
Rostow, W., 1960, Stages  of  economic growth (Cambridge University Press). 
Russell,  Bertrand,  1968,  The  autobiography  of  Bertrand  Russel:  1914-1944  (Little,  Brown  and 
Company,  Boston). 
Smith, Adam, 1776, The wealth of  nations, (Modem Library, New York,  1930). 
Sombart,  W.,  1915,  The  quintessence  of  capitalism  (New  York:  Dutton),  translated  and  edited  by  M. 
Epstein. 
Sussman, M.B., J.N. Cates and O.T.  Smith, 1970,  Inheritance and the family (Sage, New York). 
Thurow, L.,  1976,  Generating  inequality (Basic Books, New York). 
Weber, M., 1905, The protestant ethic and the  spirit of capitalism (Charles  Scribner's Sons, New York, 
1958). 
Wicksteed, Philip H.,  1933,  The common sense of political economy, 2  volumes (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul). 
Wiener,  M.,  1982,  English  culture  and  the  decline  of  the  industrial  spirit,  1850-1980  (Cambridge 
University Press). 
Zou, Heng-fu,  1993a, Economic growth, the capitalist spirit and thrift, Journal of Economic Research, 
February, 56-64 (Chinese Academy of  Social  Sciences, Beijing). 
Zou,  Heng-fu,  1993b,  The  capitalist-spirit  approach  to  growth:  A  perspective  from  the  history  of 
economic  analysis. Revised for History of Political Economy. 
Zou,  Heng-fu,  1994,  The  spirit  of  capitalism  and  long-run  growth,  European  Journal  of  Political 
Economy 10,  No. 2,  279-293. 
Zou, Heng-fu, 1995, The spirit of capitalism, savings, asset prices and growth, forthcoming, The World 
Bank and  Wuhan University. 